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An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the Allied Social Science Associations in Chicago in August,
1978. The author, an associate professor at Louisiana Tech University,
revised the paper in December, 1978.

The late Andre Hellegers pointed out how elastic the definition of
health and, therefore , the definition of health needs has become in
recent years. The World Health Organization, stated Hellegers, defines
health " as not only the absence of disease, but as the presence of a
sense of total physical, mental and social well-being." 1 In the extreme
this means, according to Hellegers, that the medical profession must
abolish death. A second definition of health is based on the absence of
discomfort and, Hellegers stated, logically requires the profession to
provide death. 2 A third definition of health views death as natural and
urges physicians to accept it.
In this article we attempt to show that there are three distinct
attitudes toward death supporting three different types of demand for
health services, and that the three types of demand have powerful
implications for basic resource requirements and costs. Furthermore,
when all of these considerations are viewed in the context of costbenefit analysis, other implications for such values as the quality of
life, a sense of community, and individual liberty follow. Finally, we
suggest a way of using cost-benefit estimates which replaces the classification of persons as (1) productive and deserving treatment or
(2) unproductive and not meriting treatment with a classification of
modes of treatment as (1) excessively expensive and properly regarded
as a gift or (2) not excessively expensive and properly regarded as an
individual right and an individual or social obligation.
Abolition of Death
The abolition of death is an attitude that emerged first in the
United States at the beginning of the 20th century and is linked historically to the enlightenment of the 18th century.3 Death is seen as
shameful and forbidden; it should be made to disappear.4 The emergence of this attitude parallels the development of science and technology which supply superior means of survival and, at the same time,
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superior means of destruction. 5 According to Elizabeth Kubler-Ross,
the new weapons of mass destruction have so increased the fear of
death by violent means that man attempts to cope with the reality of
his own death by denial. 6
The spectre of malpractice and criminal prosecution means that,
increasingly, the withholding or withdrawing of the latest technology
is equated with killing. Third-party payment schemes assure that this
technology is widely available. Kubler-Ross suggests that the demand
for technological improvements is stimulated by health professionals
who, because they are unable to accept death which from their
perspective amounts to personal failure, displace their knowledge onto
machines. This denial and displacement, in turn, seems to encourage
an increasingly mechanical and dehumanized environment in the
delivery of health services. 7
For sure, abolishing death is not the only inspiration for technological change in the health care field. Frequently the same advanced
technology is used in ways that truly affirm the value of life. Indeed
there are many instances in which sophisticated technological devices
are the only means of maintaining life while the patient is being
restored to good health.
For that reason, the abolition of death view is not the only factor
underlying the vast increases in health care expenditures that are
directly attributable to technological change. I! In those instances
where the technology is used to temporarily maintain life, the heavy
costs of this technology are properly associated with the saving of life.
If, on the other hand, it is used to maintain life when the patient has
no prospects for restoration to good health, the heavy outlays are
associated with the prolonging of death. Further, if it is employed in a
so-called hopeless case over a long period of time, it is proper to asssign
these expenditures to the abolishing of death.
Provision of Death

,

The provision of death is an attitude which views pain and suffering
as meaningless and sees death as the final solution to a life that is
regarded as devoid of meaning. As with the abolition-of-death position, the provision-of-death attitude is plainly hedonistic. 9 For centuries the provision-of-death attitude has been acted out in the form
of suicide and has been publicly allowed in that form in various
societies including ancient Rome where suicide was regarded as a
proper means for saving face. 10
Modern interest in the provision of death in the form of euthanasia
dates from the 1870s. The euthanasia movement began in Britain in
the early 1930s and came to the United States several years later. As
recently as 1972 there were no countries whose laws permitted the
practice of mercy killing. 11
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In the last few years, however, "death-with-dignity" bills have
proliferated in the United States. California enacted the first such law
in 1976. Bills of this type were introduced in at least 41 states in
1977 . In seven (Arkansas, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, and Texas), death-with-dignity bills were actually
passed. None of the new laws are perfectly alike. In California, for
instance, mercy killing is explicitly excluded. In Arkansas, Idaho, and
New Mexico, even though mercy killing is not authorized, it is not
explicitly prohibited either.12 According to Grisez and Boyle, all iof
these bills, whether enacted or not, have two serious consequences.
First, they pave the way for homicide by withholding or withdrawing
treatment, and, second, they tend to enhance support for directly
killing certain patients. 13
Clearly som.~ of the techniques of providing death (in the form of
suicide or mercy killing) are simple and inexpensive, especially by
comparison with the techniques of abolishing death. Notwithstanding
those vast differences in costs, the provision-of-death attitude and the
abolition-of-death attitude are alike in that both put man at the center
of the universe by the implicit claim that man is the author of life. In
effect, the human body is viewed as property which man may use as it
suits him. For the most part this "right" is limited to one's own body.
In the case of involuntary mercy killing, however, the "right" to
dispose of this property is claimed by another person. In that sense,
involuntary mercy killing amounts to the re-establishment of slavery
in one of its cruelest forms.
Stanley Hauerwas shows that the provision-of-death attitude, with
its emphasis on relieving suffering, has important consequences for
medical progress.
Medicine advances because physicians and those in anc illary professions
have been willing to allow others to endure pain, thereby creating the condi·
tions that impel the imagination to explore forms of care not yet co nceived . 14

Hauerwas is neither utilitarian nor sado-masochistic.
I do not suggest that suffering should b e sought for its own sake or that
suffering should b e accepte d as a way of becoming good. Rather, I am
trying to suggest that though suffering is not to be sought, neither must we
assume it should always be avoided. Often we achieve the good only because
we are willing to endure in ourselves and in others an existenc e of suffering
and pain. 15

Arthur Dyck points to one of the "goods" - a sense of community which is contingent on certain constraints against killing, suicide in
particular .
Suicide is the ultimately e ffective way of shutting out all other people
from one's life. Every kind of potentia lly and actually meaningful contact
and relation among persons is irrevocab ly severed except by means of
m emories or other forms of life beyond death.
An inevitabl e death can b e accepted without guilt; the decision on the
part of the dying one that h e or she h as no worth to anyone can leav e tragic
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overtones and guilt-ridden doubts for anyone who participated in even the
smallest way in that p erson's dying . . ..
Everyone and every group in a community is potentially a victim of a
principle that accepts some lives as unworthy to live; the very young, the
very old, and racial and ethnic minorities are especially threatened in a
society that accepts such a principle. 16

Acceptance of Death
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The acceptance-of-death attitude has its historical roots in the early
Middle Ages. 17 It occupies the middle ground between the extremes
of the abolition-of-d.eath view with its high-cost, complex technology
and the provision-of-death view with its low-cost, simple technology.
It neither prolongs the dying needlessly nor precipitates it directly and
intentionally.
Whereas the other two incorporate the property concept of the
relationship between person and body, the acceptance-of-death viewpoint incorporates the stewardship concept. Whereas the other two are
anthropocentric, the acceptance-of-death position is theocentric.
Suffering is regarded as meaningful because one's reward in heaven
depends on "the courage and grace, patience and dignity" with which
the burden of suffering is shouldered. 18
The acceptance-of-death view is perhaps best demonstrated by the
hospice concept of care for the dying. This concept of care emphasizes
control of the patient's symptoms to enable that person to come to
grips with his impending death. The collaboration between family and
staff in the care of the dying is one important way that a hospice
promotes a sense of community. 19
The hospice concept rejects the high-cost, complex technology that
characterizes the abolition-of-death view on grounds that, for the
terminally ill. it prolongs the dying needlessly. Figures published in
1976 indicate that the daily charges at the hospice in New Haven ,
Connecticut are roughly one-half the rate at a general hospital.2 o It
also rejects the low-cost, simple technology of the provision-of-death
view on grounds that the patient who asks to be killed is not receiving
the health care he needs. 21 Hospice care is not expensive. The rate in
1976 at the New Haven facility was $104-108 per day. 22
The hospice concept is based on the well-known principle that
ordinary means of survival are to be provided because those means are
the only ones that the patient can claim as being owed in justice. 23
The principle of ordinary means embodies certain normative concepts
that are likely to be defined differently by different persons in different circumstances. Even though at times it may be quite difficult to
differentiate ordinary from extraordinary means of survival, difficulties of this kind only complicate the application of the principle. They
do not per se invalidate it.
February, 1982
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The proper application of the principle of ordinary means may call
for judgment from specialists in fields other than medicine, such as
law, economics, and psychology. With regard to economics, it is
instructive that the principle of ordinary means is consistent with
Heinrich Pesch's principle of satisfying adequately normal human
needs. Rupert Ederer translates what Pesch means by this principle as
follows:
The task of the economic process is the optimum satisfacton of peoples'
wants that is possible in given circumstances of time and place, where
individualized wants are satisfied only with due reference to the general
context of wants. 24

The principle of ordinary means does not imply that the patient
may not avail himself of certain extraordinary means of survival. It
connotes, rather, that such means need not be provided. Their
provision, therefore, is to be viewed not as morally required but as
freely given.
Cost-Benefit Estimates: The Conventional Application
The logic of cost-benefit analysis argues that health services be
provided to those for whom the benefits exceed the costs and be
withheld from those for whom benefits fall short of costs. The
coupling of cost-benefit rules and the abolition-of-death viewpoint
leads to different outcomes when freedom of choice is allowed and
when it is not allowed, unless actually wanting to live is critical to
survival. Among persons in need of health services, proportionately
more of those who are treated than those who are not will survive
whether they freely choose treatment or not. This means that some
who are treated will not survive and some who are in need and are not
treated will survive. Some, possibly most, of those who are treated and
survive will be satisfied with the outcome and others will not. Some of
the latter group may become so despondent over the quality of life
that they end it by their own hand.
Allowing freedom of choice is likely to be more costly than denying
it. Some of those who are in need and for whom the costs are less than
the benefits will not choose to be treated and consequently will be
more likely to die. Some for whom the costs are greater than the
benefits will choose to be treated and consequently will be more likely
to live. Clearly, the freedom-of-choice option drives up the cost of an
already high-cost delivery system.
The great advantages that derive from implementing the abolitionof-death view is that some persons who are in need of services and are
treated will live longer. For some, however, the additional longevity
amounts to simply prolonging the dying. Moreover, the complex tech52
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nology tends to separate the patient from the staff, thereby dehumanizing the patient. When suicide is permitted, the abolition-of-death
view becomes especially destructive of a sense of community.
In principle, the utilitarian logic of cost-benefit decision-making,
when it is coupled with involuntary mercy killing, results in certain
death for all persons in need of health services for whom the costs of
treatment exceed the benefits. Some of those who qualify for treatment under these strict rules will die anyway. Others will survive but
may choose later to end their life out of despair as to the compelling
requirement to remain productive in order to justify their continued
existence. Removing the involuntary mercy killing provision makes for
greater uncertainty as to final outcome. Some of those for whom the
costs of treatment exceed the benefits will choose life and some of
those with benefits in excess of costs will choose death.
The great advantage of the provision-of-death view is found in its
cost-containment potential. However, the killing that attends this
view, as Dyck points out, is most destructive of a sense of community.
Furthermore, involuntary mercy killing spells the end of individual
liberty because the taking of a human life destroys all other rights and
freedoms of that person.
Cost-benefit rules have an important impact on outcomes when
they are linked with the acceptance-of-death view and freedom of
choice as to the use of extraordinary means is denied. Under these
circumstances only those persons in need for whom the costs are less
than the benefits qualify for treatment that employs extraordinary
means. Strictly speaking, health care is either owed in justice or it is
merited. It cannot be given freely.
At first glance, these rules seem not to affect the outcome when
freedom of choice is allowed. However, they do matter importantly
and Piper shows us why.
Th e possibility - indeed, the n ecessity - of a consistent policy of
manipulating others and calculating their responses as variables in the service
of a larger goal reveals a serious problem with the very concept of a consis·
tent Utilitarian doctrine... . The first principle of Utilitarianism can be seen
as a special case of th e non·moral rationality principle of efficient means, in
which the particular goal to b e most expediently achieved is specified as
that of maximizing social utility ....
The goal of maximizing social utility is so e ncompassing that any act
performed in an interpersonal context must be evaluated for whether its
consequences are relevant to, or constitutive of, its realization.
This means that a concern with soc ial utility must form some part of the
motivation of a consistent Utilitarian in any interact ion he engages in,
indeed in any play of action h e undertakes: this is the full sense in which
Utilitarianism provides the only rule of conduct for one committed to t his
doctrine. It may b e that some such activities are then found or judged to be
irre levant to furthering social utility. But this can only be a consequ ence,
and not a presupposition, of an evaluation to which every action is initially
susceptible. This reveals the extent to which calculation - hence manipula·
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tion - must inform the Utilitarian's every decision, action, and deliberate
[·esponse.
So if people know that someone is a committed Utilitarian, they are
bound to feel somewhat used or manipulated, somewhat suspicious of his
manifestations or feeling, involvement with or professed regard for them,
and somewhat resentfu l of his attitude. 25

The manipulation that inevitably results when cost-benefit rules are
employed in the decisions as to the proper allocation of health services
is inimical to the virtue of trust which is the disposition most proper
to the physician-patient relationship.26 It follows that cost-benefit
rules can be a direct threat to the foundations of a caring health
services delivery system.
Cost-Benefit Estimates: A Suggested Application
It does not follow, however, that cost-benefit estimates should
never be used in the treatment decision. One of the central problems
with the conventional application of cost-benefit estimates in the
health services field is that it does not differentiate ordinary from
extraordinary means of survival. Further, it classifies individual
patients dichotomously: the ones who merit treatment because they
are sufficiently productive and the ones who do not merit treatment
because they are not sufficiently productive.
This arbitrary classification of persons can be eliminated if costbenefit estimates are used instead to classify modes of treatment as
excessively expensive (extraordinary means) or not excessively expensive (ordinary means). Table 1 displays a scheme for classifying modes
of treatment as ordinary or extraordinary according to a comparison
of current costs and benefits (row 1) and current and future costs and
benefits (row 2) for the individual person in need using personal
resources (column 1) and for all persons in need using society's
resources (column 2). For example, a mode of treatment which at
present is excessively expensive (EE) for a person who is destitute may
be classified as not excessively expensive (NEE) for all persons with
the same need because of significant differences in the resources available in society. Additionally, the same mode of treatment which is
classified as NEE today may be considered EE because of costs that
are deferred to the future.
The modes of treatment that are classified as NEE are owed in
justice as a corollary from the right to life itself (see our footnote 23).
This obligation in justice does not extend to the modes that are classified as EE although such means may be provided as gifts.
For sure, there are serious difficulties that attend the use of the
normative concept "excessively expensive." Different definitions will
be supplied by different persons in different circumstances. Even so,
there are some important advantages that follow from the elastic
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TABLE 1. Scheme for Classifying Modes of Treatment
as Ordinary or Extraordinary Means: Norm of Economic Burden

Individuals in Need
Using
Personal Resources

Comparison of:

All Persons in Need
Using
Society's Resources

Cu rrent Costs and
Benefits

EE

NEE

Current and Future
Costs and Benefits

EE

EE

I

•

(

I

EE:
NEE:

Excessively Expensive
Not Excessively Expensive

nature of the concept. Surgery such as hip-joint replacement is more
likely to be EE in a relatively poor country like Mexico than in a
wealthy country like the United States. Further, the definition that
applies in a particular place is supplied by those who live there and
who Will bear the burden and reap the rewards that go with it.
To give precise meaning to "excessively expensive, " studies are
needed that show the actual costs and benefits for vari9us modes of
treatment and kinds of patients. By revealing how various persons and
families actually manage their financial affairs when they become sick
and are treated, these studies would enable us to specify with greater
particularity whether a given service is EE or not.
Using the scheme presented in Table 1, there are 14 classification
sets possible for every treatment mode. Applying the principles of subsidiarity, equality , and the common good, along with Pesch 's principle
of satisfying adequately normal human needs, the 14 sets can be
grouped into two broad classes: sets 1-4 and sets 5-14 (Table 2). In set
1 the treatment mode is properly regarded as an individual right and
obligation in justice. Sets 2 through 4 are closely r elated t o set 1 ; the
treatment mode is regarded as an individual right and a social obligation. A social obligation need not require government intervention. It
may be met through private third-party payment schemes.
In set 5 the treatment mode is properly regarded as a gift. So too is
it in sets 6 through 11 which evidence no conflict between the individFebruary, 1982
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TABLE 2. Scheme for Determining Whether Treatment Mode
Is a Right and an Obligation or a Gift

Gift

Right/Obligation

NEE

I

(1 )

NEE

NEE

EE

NEE

EE

(2)

NEE

~

NEE

~ ~ ~
(9)

NEE

NEE

I
NEE
EE

I

NEE

(3)

(7)

EE

~
EE

I

~
EE

NEE

(4)

EE

NEE

NEE

NEE

NEE

EE

NEE

EE

NEE

EE

(12)

(13)

(10)

EE

I

~ ~
(8)

EE

NEE

I

~
EE

NEE

EE

(6)

NEE

NEE

(5)

EE

EE

(14)

(11 )

NEE

I

I
EE:
NEE:

Excessively Expensive
Not Excessively Expensive

(1)

Individual must provide for own needs and take treatment mode required for
survival. Society is not obliged to help individual, although it may have to
force individual to take treatment mode required.

(2)

Individual cannot afford treatment mode at present, but society can afford it
for everyone in need. Treatment mode is social obligation and individual
right. Individual must take treatment mode provided by society.

(3)

Individual cannot afford treatment mode because of future burden, but
society can for everyone in need. Treatment mode is social obligation and
individual right. Individual must take treatment mode provided by society.

(4)

Individual cannot afford treatment mode because of current and future
burden, but society can for everyone in need. Treatment mode is social
obligation and individual right. Individual must take treatment mode provided
by society.
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(5) Treatment mode is EE for individual and society. Individual can refuse to
provide or take treatment mode and society is not obliged to provide it.
Treatment mode may be provided as gift by one individual to another, or by
society to various individuals selected at random to reflect basic equality of
those in need.
\.

(6) Treatment mode is EE in terms of current burden. Individual can refuse to
provide or take treatment mode and society is not obliged to provide it.
Treatment mode may be provided as gift.
(7) Treatment mode is EE in terms of overall burden. Individual can refuse to

provide or take treatment mode and society is not obliged to provide it.
Treatment mode may be provided as gift.
(8) Treatment mode is EE for individual and society when current and future
costs and benefits are evaluated in terms of resources available. Individual can
refuse to provide or take treatment mode. and society is not obliged to
provide it. Treatment mode may be provided as gift.
(9) Treatment mode is EE at present for individual and society. Individual can
refuse to provide or take treatment mode and society is not obliged to
provide it. Treatment mode may be provided as gift.
(10) Treatment mode is EE when current and future costs and benefits are eval·
uated in terms of resources available. Individual can refuse to provide or take
treatment mode and society is not obliged to provide it. Treatment mode may
be provided as gift.
(11) Treatment mode is EE at present for individual and society. Individual can
refuse to provide or take treatment mode and society is not obliged to
provide it. Treatment mode may be provided as gift.
(12) Treatment mode is NEE for individual who is required to provide and take it.
However, it is EE for society at present. Common good argues that society
limit individual freedom. Conflict is resolved by allowing only certain individ·
uals, selected at random, to exercise their right. Under these circumstances
treatment mode becomes gift.
(13) Treatment mode is NEE for individual who is required to provide and take it.
However, it is EE for society when current and future costs and benefits are
evaluated in terms of resources available to society. Common good argues that
society limit individual freedom. Conflict is resolved by allowing only certain
individuals, selected at random, to exercise their right. Treatment mode
becomes a gift.
(14) Treatment mode is NEE for individual who is required to provide and take it.
However, it is EE for society at present and overall. Common good argues
that society limit individual freedom. Conflict is resolved by allowing certain
individuals, selected at random, to exercise their right. Treatment mode
becomes gift.
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ual and society. Sets 12 through 14 are like set 5 in the sense that the
treatment mode is regarded as a gift. They are unlike the others
because they reflect conflict between the individual and society which
is resolved by the application of the principle of common good.
A final step in the research to evaluate the health care system in
terms of the health needs of persons who would otherwise die involves
a determination as to whether or not the system actually delivers what
is owed in justice and if not, what modifications are necessary to
assure that the ordinary means of survival are routinely available.
Further, research should be conducted to determine if the health care
system is being coerced into delivering services which are properly
classified as extraordinary means of survival since health services that
are delivered under coercion cannot be regarded as gifts. If such
coercion exists, the system requires modification that would end such
abuse but would still allow the practice of extraordinary means that
are freely given.
In our judgment there is no compelling evidence that the U.S.
health care delivery system requires additional public intervention to
meet the health needs (properly understood) of persons in extremis.
Indeed, if such intervention were to fail to recognize the difference
between excessively expensive and not excessively expensive treatment
modes, it is quite possible that health care costs will escalate at a rate
higher than the current one. Accordingly we suggest that the resource
allocation system offering the best promise of controlling the rising
cost of health care is one that uses market prices to allocate resources
among competing uses and one in which all payment schemes
acknowledge the essential difference between excessively expensive
and not excessively expensive means of survival.
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